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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SPENCERPORT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and-
SPENCERPORT TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
Charging Party. 
THEALAN ASSOCIATES. INC. (ANTHONY P. DiROCCO. of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
GILBERT BIANCUCCI, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Spencerport Central School District (District) to a hearing 
officer's decision that it violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor 
Law by changing a procedure for advance reporting of 
absences, without having negotiated the change with the 
Spencerport Teachers Association (Association). the 
representative of the teachers. 
Under the procedure prior to September 1982, teachers 
who expected to be absent were required to inform the 
"substitute" office. They could do so by telephone at any 
hour of the day or night, leaving a message on a recording 
device when the office was not staffed. 
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Under the new procedure, a teacher expecting to be 
absent was required to inform his immediate supervisor. Each 
of the ten supervisory employees issued a notice as to when 
he could be called. Some wished to be called at about 6:00 
a.m., others at about 7:00 a.m. All indicated their 
willingness to be called the previous evening up to either 
9:00 or 10:00 p.m., and some were willing to accept calls 
late at night in emergency situations, while other were not. 
The District argued that the change that it made in 
September 1982 was administrative in nature and a management 
prerogative, and. hence, not subject to negotiation. This 
argument was rejected by the hearing officer. He found that 
the new procedure was more than an administrative change, 
because under the old procedure a teacher could report his 
anticipated absence at any time during the day or night, 
while under the new procedure a teacher who became ill after 
9:00 or 10:00 p.m. might suffer a hardship in having to wait 
until 6:00 or 7:00 a.m. to report. Applying the balancing 
test specified in City of New Rochelle. 13 PERB 1P082 (1980). 
the hearing officer noted that there was no evidence in the 
record nor any argument made by the District indicating that 
the change would have a major impact upon the District's 
managerial responsibilities. 
The exceptions argue that the hearing officer erred in 
finding that the impact of the change upon teachers was 
8482 
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significant and that, even if it were, the District would be 
required to negotiate only the impact of the change, and not 
the change itself. They also argue that the hearing officer 
erred in relying upon the absence of evidence as to the 
District's reasons for requiring a new procedure. The 
District notes that the case came to the hearing officer on a 
stipulated record which did not deal with the District's 
reasons and it contends that if he considered the matter 
material to his decision, the hearing officer should have 
held a hearing. 
We affirm the decision of the hearing officer. The 
unilateral change made by the District involved a mandatory 
subject of negotiation in that it deprived teachers of the 
opportunity to report an illness during late night hours, 
compelling them to awaken early the following morning in 
order to do so. Accordingly, the subject of when such 
reports can be made is a term and condition of employment of 
the teachers. 
We also conclude that the hearing officer committed no 
error in relying upon the record as made by the parties' 
stipulation. The District was given the opportunity to 
propose whatever information it thought relevant for 
inclusion in the stipulation that constitutes the record. 
The absence of any submission regarding its reasons for 
making the change was the result of its own decision. 
Board - U-6509 -4 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the District to: 
1. cease and desist from requiring 
compliance with the new call-in 
procedure for reporting teacher 
absences, and to forthwith return to the 
procedure in effect prior to September 
1982; 
2. negotiate in good faith with the 
Association over terms and conditions of 
employment; 
3. sign and post the attached notice at all 
locations normally used to communicate 
with employees in the unit represented 
by the Association. 
DATED: August 24. 1983 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida KLaus^ Member 
David C. Randies, MemJser 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees in the negotiating unit represented by the 
Spencerport Teachers Association that the Spencerport Central School District 
will: 
1. Not require compliance with the new call-in procedure for reporting 
absences and will forthwith return to the procedure in effect prior 
to September 1982; 
2. Negotiate in good faith with the Association over terms and conditions 
of employment. 
Spencerport Central School District. 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
O-liV 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF NORTH TONAWANDA HOUSING 
AUTHORITY. 
#2B-8/24/83 
Respondent, Case No. U-6109 
-and-
AFSCME N.Y. COUNCIL 66 and its AFFILIATED 
LOCAL 515B. CITY OF NORTH TONAWANDA 
HOUSING AUTHORITY EMPLOYEES. 
Charging Party. 
SCHNELL & SALMON. ESQS. (RICHARD E. SCHNELL. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
MICHAEL A. TREMONT. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of AFSCME N.Y. 
Council 66 and its affiliated Local 515B. City of North 
Tonawanda Housing Authority Employees (AFSCME) to the decision 
of the hearing officer dismissing its charge that the City of 
North Tonawanda Housing Authority (Authority) violated CSL 
§209-a.l(a). (c) and (d) when on April 30. 1982. it terminated 
the employment of Robert Graap, a member of the negotiating 
unit represented by AFSCME. 
This charge involves events which occurred during the 
pendency before us of an earlier charge filed by AFSCME on 
•;• i v^-liV. 
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behalf of Graap; in particular, between the date of the hearing 
officer's decision on that earlier charge - December 22, 1981, 
and the date of our decision affirming the hearing officer -
May 10, 1982.- The hearing officer had found that the 
Authority's termination of Graap on May 15, 1981 constituted an 
improper practice and ordered the reinstatement of Graap to his 
former position, retroactive in all respects to the date of his 
termination. In affirming the hearing officer we directed the 
same remedy. 
After the hearing officer's decision on the earlier 
charge, the Authority's attorney requested AFSCME's attorney to 
consent to an extension of time to file exceptions. AFSCME's 
attorney consented on condition that the Authority reinstate 
Graap. The condition was accepted and Graap was reinstated on 
or about January 18, 1982. pending this Board's decision, at 
2/ the same rate of compensation he had previously received.— 
On April 30. 1982, however, this arrangement was ended and 
1/city of North Tonawanda Housing Authority, 14 PERB 
ir4672 (1981). aff'd 15 PERB V3044 (1982). 
2/It appears from the record in the earlier case that, 
prior to his first termination Graap's position of maintenance 
laborer had been reclassified to maintenance mechanic, but 
pursuant to an agreement between AFSCME and the Authority, he 
continued to receive the pay of a maintenance laborer with the 
understanding that he would be assigned only the duties of that 
position. The subsequent assignment of out-of-title work led 
to the filing of grievances which, we found, was the reason for 
his termination in 1981. 
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he was separated from his employment. The issue presented in 
this case is whether the second termination decision was 
improperly motivated or was for legitimate reasons. We agree 
with the hearing officer that the Authority's action must be 
viewed with suspicion because it urges that the second 
termination was based, in large part, on financial reasons 
which we rejected as the true motivation in the first case. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of the record in this case, we must 
affirm the hearing officer's decision that AFSCME has not 
established that the April 1982 termination was motivated by 
Graap's participation in activities protected by the Taylor Law. 
FACTS 
As in the first case. AFSCME relies exclusively on 
testimony regarding the activities and statements of the 
Authority's Executive Director, Krause. AFSCME refers to 
incidents which occurred following Graap's return to work in 
January 1982. as evidence that the earlier grievances and a 
grievance filed by him on March 15. 1982. were the principal 
reasons why Graap's position was eliminated in April, and not 
the financial concerns of the Authority. It urges that 
Krause's antipathy, established in the prior proceeding, was 
again the motivating factor in Graap's termination. 
Graap testified that after his reemployment he questioned 
his lack of overtime assignments and Krause told him that he 
was not entitled to overtime under the collective bargaining 
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agreement. Graap's health insurance was not restored for 
almost a month after he returned and he had to complain to 
AFSCME before he was given contractual sick days. Krause also 
told him that, pending the decision on the improper practice 
charge, he was not entitled to vacation leave. Graap also 
testified concerning a grievance which he filed objecting to 
the placing of an adverse performance evaluation in his 
personnel record. That grievance was not pursued by AFSCME. 
apparently because it acknowledged the employer's right to 
place performance evaluations in personnel records. All of 
these events occurred prior to March 31. 1982. AFSCME also 
relies upon a conversation between Graap and Krause on 
April 22. 1982. in which Krause stated, among other things, 
that Graap got "everyone upset" by his filing of the original 
grievances regarding out-of-title pay. 
In the hearing on the first charge only Krause testified 
on behalf of the Authority and the hearing officer rejected his 
testimony that Graap's position was eliminated due to financial 
reasons. We stated that we found no basis for disturbing the 
hearing officer's credibility determinations. In the hearing 
of the instant charge, however, three members of the Authority, 
including two who made up the Budget Committee, testified. 
They testified that, in accordance with the usual budgetary 
process, Krause submitted to the Budget Committee a draft 
budget for the fiscal year beginning April 1, 1982. which 
S8S 
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contained all existing blue-collar positions, including 
Graap's. The Budget Committee decided to eliminate funding for 
one blue-collar position in order to achieve a balanced 
budget. The parties stipulated on the record that there was 
unit-wide seniority for layoff purposes and that Graap was the 
least senior unit employee. The Budget Committee submitted its 
budget to the full Board for approval. Both members of the 
Budget Committee testified that neither they nor. to their 
knowledge, any other Authority member ever discussed with 
Krause the abolishment of Graap's job. Without further input 
or discussion with Krause. the Board, on or before April 1. 
1982. approved the budget containing the elimination of funding 
for Graap's position. The Board members testified that this 
was done not only because of the perceived necessity of doing 
so in order to balance the budget, but also because it had been 
observed that no deterioration had occurred to the Authority's 
buildings and grounds during Graap's prior improper termination 
and that, in their judgment, the position was not needed to 
keep the premises maintained. 
Graap was notified by Krause on March 31. 1982. that his 
laborer position would not be funded for the ensuing fiscal 
year and that, accordingly, his services would be terminated on 
March 31. 1982. After AFSCME's attorney complained to the 
Authority's attorney that this would violate their agreement to 
retain Graap until this Board's decision, the Authority agreed 
to retain Graap. Since there was no funded position out of 
i" -r* . s ,---'*. H W :) 
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which to pay Graap he was paid out of other funds and the 
Authority considered him to be in the status of an independent 
contractor. This arrangement ceased on April 30. 1982. when 
Graap was advised that his services would terminate on that 
date because of lack of funds. 
DISCUSSION 
We are. of course, constrained to decide the merits of 
improper practice charges on the basis of the record evidence 
before us in each case. On the basis of such evidence, we may 
resolve credibility issues, draw reasonable inferences, and 
make findings of fact. In a case such as this one. however, it 
would be unreasonable for us to ignore entirely our findings 
made little more than a year ago in a case involving the same 
parties and essentially the same situation. 
The difference between the first case and this one, 
however, is in the nature of the proof submitted by the 
Authority. In analyzing the evidence presented to him in the 
first case the hearing officer stated: "In view of the 
inference of colorable motive founded upon Krause's 
misbehavior, it was incumbent upon the Authority to come 
forward with credible evidence of the propriety of its action" 
(14 PERB 1f4672, at pp. 4842-3). In affirming the hearing 
officer's decision we stated: "It is based upon conclusions 
that flow logically from uncontested allegations of fact". (15 
PERB ir3044. at p. 3073). 
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In this case the Authority has presented uncontroverted 
testimony that its members were not influenced by, nor shared, 
Krause's "antipathy" toward Graap when the decision was made by 
them not to fund the position occupied by Graap. It presented 
uncontroverted testimony that that decision was based only on 
financial considerations and the members' judgment that a 
blue-collar position had to be eliminated. In consequence of 
that determination, Graap, being the least senior in the unit, 
was terminated. The Authority presented uncontroverted 
testimony that the decision was made and was intended to be 
effectuated on or before April 1. 1982, and that Graap1s 
continued employment to April 30, 1982, was due entirely to the 
agreement between the attorneys. Given such evidence of the 
Authority's conduct and motivation, we cannot in this case, as 
we could in the first case, attribute to the Authority the 
motivation inferable from Krause's conduct and statements. 
Accordingly, we must affirm the hearing officer's dismissal of . 
AFSCME's charge. 
This decision does not affect our order issued in the 
first case. We there found that Graap had been illegally 
terminated in 1981 and we directed that he be reinstated, 
retroactive in all respects to the date of his termination and 
be made whole for any loss of pay and benefits. We now find 
that his termination in April 1982 was not unlawful. An 
employee restored to a position by virtue of our order does not 
thereby receive permanent immunity from discharge. 
-,- Q'tiQO 
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NOW THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 24, 1983 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randl&s. Mejrfber 
' ^~>~J£%J 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (INSURANCE 
DEPARTMENT LIQUIDATION BUREAU) , #2C-8/24/83 
Respondent, 
-an&- CASE NO. U-6845 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC.. LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
GRAUBARD. MOSKOVITZ. McGOLDRICK. DANNETT & 
HOROWITZ. ESQS.. for Respondent 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH. ESQS. (DONA S. BULLUCK. 
ESQ.. of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Civil Service Employees Association. Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME. AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision of the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing its charge that the Liquidation Bureau of the 
Insurance Department of the State of New York (Bureau) 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by unilaterally 
changing the wages of certain Bureau employees. 
Board - U-6845 
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CSEA was not the recognized or certified representative of 
the employees of the Bureau at the time when the alleged 
unilateral action occurred. It did have a representation 
petition pending before this Board. 
The Director dismissed the charge on the ground that the 
Bureau had not been obliged to negotiate with CSEA because it 
was not recognized or certified. In its exceptions CSEA argues 
that the dismissal should have been a conditional one. 
permitting the reinstatement of the charge if it should be 
certified in the representation proceeding then pending. It 
asserts that this is necessary in order to prevent a time bar 
of the charge if the certification takes place more than four 
months after the alleged improper conduct. 
We affirm the decision of the Director. That CSEA was 
neither recognized nor certified at the time when the Bureau 
allegedly changed the wages of its employees is a substantive 
rather than a procedural defect in the charge.— As the 
Bureau was not obliged to negotiate with CSEA at the time when 
it allegedly acted unilaterally, the subsequent certification 
of CSEA could not impose a retroactive duty upon the Bureau to 
2/ 
negotiate the change as of the time it was made.— 
i/section 209-a.l(d) provides that it is improper for 
a public employer "to refuse to negotiate in good faith 
with the duly recognized or certified representatives of 
its public employees." (emphasis supplied) 
2/citv of Mount Vernon. 11 PERB 1f3095 (1978). 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: August 24. 1983 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/e*W 
David C. Randies .^ Memb/jfr 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PEEKSKILL CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and-
PlEEKSKILLT FACULTY ASSOCIAT'ION. 
LOCAL 2916. NYSUT, 
Charging Party. 
PEEKSKILL FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 2916. NYSUT. 
Respondent, 
CASE NOS. U-6587. 
-and- U-6588 & U-6619 
PEEKSKILL CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Charging Party. 
RAINS & POGREBIN. P.C. (TERENCE M. O'NEIL. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Peekskill City School District 
DONALD R. PIERCE, for Peekskill Faculty Association. 
Local 2916. NYSUT 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The four cases before us all involve the Peekskill 
City School District (District) and the Peekskill Faculty 
Association. Local 2916. NYSUT (Association). The first 
three of the cases were consolidated by the hearing officer 
for hearing and decision, while the fourth was decided by 
her separately on a stipulated record. As each of the four 
#20-8/24/83 
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cases relates to negotiations for an agreement that was to 
succeed one that expired on August 30, 1982, we deal with 
them all in this decision. 
FACTS 
The parties commenced negotiations on April 26, 1982. 
The Association sought a three-year agreement, while the 
District sought a one-year agreement. At negotiation 
sessions held on May 10 and June 7, 1982, the parties 
"signed off" on various provisions that were in the prior 
agreement. The Association then filed an unrelated 
improper practice charge and no further negotiations took 
place until November 29. 1982. 
The District changed its negotiator during the 
interim. The new negotiator agreed-with the Association 
that a three-year agreement was desirable. He took the 
position, however, that nonmandatory items agreed upon the 
previous May and June be excluded from the contract being 
negotiated. The Association denied any obligation to 
renegotiate matters agreed upon the previous spring, but it 
indicated that it was willing to consider the District's 
proposals regarding these matters on a selective basis. 
The District then suggested that the parties negotiate the 
open issues while the status of the earlier agreements 
would be litigated. 
This suggestion was not accepted by the Association, 
and it declared impasse on January 6, 1983. Six days later 
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the Director of Conciliation appointed a conciliator to 
assist the District and the Association to resolve the 
negotiation dispute, and he designated that person as fact 
finder. The parties met with the fact finder on one 
occasion, at which time he attempted to resolve the dispute 
by mediation. 
The Association filed a charge against the District 
(U-6580) on January 13. 1983. It alleged that the District 
violated its duty to negotiate in good faith by repudiating 
previously agreed upon matters. Four days later the 
District filed two charges against the Association. The 
first (U-6587) alleged that the Association refused to 
negotiate the District's demand that certain items in the 
expired agreement be deleted from any subseguent agreement. 
In its second charge (U-6588). the District complained that 
the Association had declared impasse prematurely. 
Subsequently, in a third charge (U-6619). the District 
complained that the Association had improperly insisted upon 
demands involving nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. 
DISCUSSION 
1. The Association's Charge (U-6580) 
The District raised four defenses to the Association's 
charge, all of which were rejected by the hearing officer. 
First it alleged that the parties did not actually "sign off" 
on the various agreements because their agreement was 
<* 8492 
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conditioned upon further agreement of an entire package. 
Second, it asserted that the five and a half month hiatus 
between the initial agreements and the resumption of 
negotiations justified its reopening of the agreed upon 
items. Third, it contended that its change from seeking a 
one-year contract to advocacy of a three-year contract is 
sufficient to justify repudiation of the partial agreements. 
Finally, the District argued that the enactment of 
§209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law in July 1982 justified its 
repudiation of so much of the prior agreements as involved 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. 
These four arguments are now made by the District in its 
exceptions to the hearing officer's determination that its 
repudiation of its agreements of May and June 1982 was 
improper. We reject the first three arguments for the 
reasons stated by the hearing officer. 
The record clearly indicates that the agreements of May 
and June 1982 had been unconditional. We further find that a 
five and a half month hiatus in negotiations does not justify 
a party's repudiation of agreements unless there has been a 
significant change in relevant circumstances during the 
interim. There is no showing that the change in the 
District's negotiating posture as to the term of the contract 
is of such significance. The obligations imposed by the 
8500 
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* 
partial agreements were not related to an agreement of any 
particular duration. 
The enactment of §209-a.l(e) after the partial 
agreements were reached does, however, justify the District's 
repudiation of those agreements to the extent that they 
covered nonmandatory subjects of negotiation.— The 
withdrawal of a partial agreement may be justified under 
certain circumstances. For example, changed economic 
circumstances may justify withdrawal from a partial agreement 
before full agreement has been reached where there is no 
evidence of an intention to frustrate the reaching of a final 
agreement. Clinton Foods. Inc.. 112 NLRB 239. 3 6 LRRM 1006 
(1955). By analogy, the enactment of a new law which changes 
the legal effect of partial agreements may justify the 
withdrawal of those agreements. 
The enactment of §209-a.l(e) has a significant impact 
upon nonmandatory subjects of negotiation contained in an 
expired agreement. They cannot now be withdrawn unilaterally 
by the public employer at the conclusion of the contract term 
i/ln pertinent part. §209-a.l(e) provides: 
It shall be an improper practice for a public 
employer or its agents deliberately . . . to refuse 
to continue all the terms of an expired agreement 
until a new agreement is negotiated . . . . 
„ 8501 
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2/ 
as was the case before the enactment.— Accordingly, we 
determine that the District's repudiation subsequent to the 
amendment, of agreements it made before the amendment, did 
not violate the Taylor law insofar as those agreements may 
have dealt with nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. 
However, as the new enactment did not make any such 
significant change in the effect of agreed upon mandatory 
subjects of negotiation, the District's repudiation of its 
agreements of May and June 1982 did violate the Taylor Law 
insofar as these agreements may have dealt with mandatory 
subjects of negotiation. 
We will remand this matter to the hearing officer to 
"> determine which of the agreements of May and June 1982 
involved mandatory subjects of negotiation and which did not. 
and to rule accordingly. 
2. The District's Charges 
a. The Association's Refusal to Reopen Negotiations 
(U-6587) 
The hearing officer rejected most of the District's 
charge in case U-6587 on the ground that the Association 
had no obligation to negotiate matters already agreed 
2/Contrast Board of Higher Education of the City of 
New York. 7 PERB 1P028 (1974). and Cohoes City School 
District. 12 PERB 1f3113 (1979), with Niagara County. 16 
PERB ir3071 (1983) . 
^8502 
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3/ . . . 
upon.— We affirm her decision. To the extent that the 
demands deal with mandatory subjects of negotiation that 
had been agreed upon unconditionally, we have already 
decided that the District's attempt to reopen negotiations 
was improper; to the extent that the demands deal with 
nonmandatory subjects, the Association is not required to 
negotiate them. 
b. The Association's Premature Declaration of Impasse 
(U-6588) 
We also affirm the decision of the hearing officer 
dismissing the District's charge that the Association 
declared impasse prematurely. In its exceptions, the 
District contends that the declaration of impasse was 
premature because the parties had not reached any of the 
Association's demands during the period following the 
resumption of negotiations. The District notes that it had 
offered to negotiate the Association's demands, while 
holding its own in abeyance pending a determination by this 
Board as to whether the District's demands were proper. 
^/Determining that two of the demands listed in the 
District's charge did not deal with matters that had been 
agreed upon, the hearing officer found merit in so much of 
the charge as complained about the Association's refusal to 
negotiate them. There are no exceptions to this part of 
her decision. 
5* 8lK 
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The evidence supports the hearing officer's conclusion 
that the Association acted in good faith when it declared 
impasse. It reasonably believed that the District's 
repudiation of earlier agreements had so disrupted the 
negotiation process that third party assistance was 
necessary to achieve a basis for the resumption of 
negotiations. 
c The Scope of Negotiation Charge (U-6619) 
The Association responded to the District's scope 
of negotiation charge by arguing that it did not set forth 
a prima facie case in view of the enactment of 
§209-a.l(e). The Association contended that the enactment 
changed all the allegedly nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation which were contained in the expired agreement 
into mandatory subjects, because they could not be deleted 
by the District unilaterally. The hearing officer rejected 
this argument, concluding that the new enactment does not 
obligate a public employer to negotiate the incorporation 
into a new agreement of nonmandatory subjects contained in 
an expired agreement. As the Association did not address 
the merits of any of the scope of negotiation issues, the 
hearing officer ruled on them on the basis of the 
District's brief and her own analysis. She found all but 
parts of 4 of the 19 demands that she considered to cover 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. 
mm 
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The Association's exceptions do not deal with the 
merits of the scope decision. Rather, it reasserts its 
position that the enactment of §209-a.l(e) has mandated the 
negotiation of the continuation of all clauses of an 
expired contract even if the clauses would not ordinarily 
be mandatory. We affirm the decision of the hearing 
officer rejecting this argument. While §209-a.l(e) 
requires a public employer to continue the terms of an 
expired contract until a new agreement is reached, it does 
not require the public employer to negotiate a demand for 
the inclusion in a successor agreement of nonmandatory 
subjects of bargaining that may have been in the expired 
agreement. 
The Association's exceptions also argue that the 
filing of the scope charge was premature in that it had 
never insisted that a fact finder make recommendations 
4/ 
regarding any of its demands.— In the instant case. 
1/ln Monroe Woodbury Teachers Association. 10 PERB 
ir3029 (1977), the majority of the Board held that improper 
insistence occurs when a party submits "open [nonmandatory] 
issues to a neutral for his nonbinding determination." 
Board Member Klaus wrote a dissenting opinion saying that a 
party does not "insist" upon the negotiation of a 
nonmandatory subject by submitting it for a fact-finding 
determination, as she deemed fact finding to be part of the 
negotiation process. 
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the District and the Association had one session with the 
fact finder appointed by the Director of Conciliation and 
did present all its demands to him. The record shows, 
however, that those demands were not presented to him for 
his formal recommendations as he was performing a mediatory 
function at that stage. The charge was. therefore, without 
any legal basis. 
In its response to the Association's exceptions, the 
District argues that we should not now take cognizance of 
the fact that the demands had not been presented to the 
fact finder for formal recommendations because that fact is 
not set forth in the record. We reject this argument. 
While the Association did not make a timely allegation that 
the fact-finding process had not commenced before the 
charge was filed, the prematurity of the charge is apparent 
on the face of the charge. It does not allege that the 
Association submitted nonmandatory subjects of negotiation 
to a fact finder for his recommendations but that "the 
Association has not, as of this date, indicated that it 
will not pursue such items to fact finding . . . ." This 
anticipatory language revealed the operative fact. 
Accordingly, we find merit in this exception of the 
Association and we dismiss the charge. 
8506 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that: 
1. Case No. U-6580 be remanded to the 
hearing officer to determine which of 
the agreements of May and June 1982 
involved mandatory subjects of 
negotiation and which did not, and to 
rule accordingly; 
2. The exceptions in Case No. U-6587 be. 
and they hereby are, dismissed. 
3. The exceptions in Case No. U-6588 be, 
and they hereby are, dismissed; 
4. The charge in Case No. U-6619 be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 24. 1983 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
%u. /d4t^-— 
Ida Klaus. Member 
David C. Randres, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HICKSVILLE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT. #3A~8/24/83 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-2643 
NASSAU EDUCATIONAL LOCAL 865, CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. INC., 
LOCAL 1000. AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Nassau Educational Local 865. 
Civil Service Employees Association. Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All teacher aides and teaching 
assistants. 
Excluded: All other employees 
-• 8508 
Certification - C-2643 page 2 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Nassau Educational Local 865, 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the unit found appropriate, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of, and administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: August 24, 1983 
Albany, New York 
7^-^^^^4^Lt {£&+(S-z« c 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
5&4^ jtJUo^^ 
I d a / K l a u s . Member 
David C. R a n d i e s , Membe 
1
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #3B-8/24/83 
DUTCHESS COUNTY BOCES. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2 649 
DUTCHESS COUNTY BOCES SUPPORT PERSONNEL 
ASSOCIATION. NEA/NY. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Dutchess County BOCES 
Support Personnel Association. NEA/NY has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Full and part-time Custodians. 
Custodial Workers. Hourly 
Custodial Workers, Bus Drivers, 
Cafeteria Workers, and Couriers. 
•• S510 
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Excluded: Supervisor of Building and 
Grounds, Cafeteria Manager and 
all others. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shallhegbtTate collectivery with the Dutchess County BOCES 
Support Personnel Association. NEA/NY and enter into a written 
agreement with such employee organization with regard to terms 
and conditions of employment of the employees in the unit found 
appropriate, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of. and administration of, 
grievances of such employees. 
DATED: August 24. 198 3 
Albany, New York 
Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
H a r o l r i R. Mtawman . 
